6 NATO troops killed in Afghanistan

By Ernesto Londoño
Wednesday, June 23, 2010; 10:55 AM

KABUL — NATO announced the death of six troops on Wednesday, underscoring the severity of the challenges here as the fate of the top U.S. commander of the military effort hung in the balance.

Two American troops were killed Tuesday in bombings in southern Afghanistan, a U.S. military spokesman said.

Four other service members, including at least one American, were killed Wednesday.

One was killed in a bombing in western Afghanistan, and the other three died in a roadside bombing and a shooting in southern Afghanistan, military officials said.

The nationalities of three of the troops were not immediately disclosed.

The latest casualties raised the death toll for NATO troops to 73 this month, suggesting that June is likely to be the deadliest month of the nearly nine-year war for the U.S.-led international force.

The troops were killed as President Obama was considering whether to fire Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal for remarks published in a Rolling Stone magazine article that were derisive of civilian administration officials.

The CIA’s Afghan Payroll

Security By Warlords

By GARETH PORTER

The revelation by the New York Times Wednesday that Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, has long been on the payroll of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is only the tip of a much bigger iceberg of heavy dependence by U.S. and NATO counterinsurgency forces on Afghan warlords for security, according to a recently published report and investigations by Australian and Canadian journalists.

U.S. and other NATO military contingents operating in the provinces of Afghanistan’s predominantly Pashtun south and east have been hiring private militias controlled by Afghan warlords, according to these sources, to provide security for their forward operating bases and other bases and to guard convoys.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has acknowledged that U.S. and NATO ties with warlords have been a cause of popular Afghan alienation from foreign military forces. But the policy is not likely to be reversed anytime soon, because U.S. and NATO officials still have no alternative to the security services the warlords provide.

A report published by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University in September notes that U.S. and NATO contingents have frequently hired security providers that are covertly owned by warlords who have “ready-made” private militias which compete with state institutions for power.

The report cites examples of major warlords or their relatives or allies who have been contracted for security services in four provinces.

In Uruzgan province, both U.S. and Australian Special Forces have contracted with a private army commanded by Col. Matiullah Khan, called Kandak Amniante Uruzgan, with 2,000 armed men, to provide security services on which their bases there depend. That case was reported in detail in April 2008 by two reporters for The Australian, Mark Dodd and Jeremy Kelly.

Col. Khan’s security force protects NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) convoys on the main road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt, where more than 1,000 Australian troops are based at Camp Holland, according to the The Australian in April 2008.

Col. Khan gets 340,000 dollars per month – nearly 4.1 million dollars annually – for getting two convoys from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt safely each month. Khan, now police chief in Uruzgan province, evidently got his private army from his uncle Jan Mohammad Khan, a commander who helped defeat the Taliban in Kandahar in 2001 and was then rewarded by President Karzai by being named governor of Uruzgan in 2002.

The Australian Defence Force claimed to The Australian that Col. Khan is paid by the Afghan Ministry of Interior to provide security on the main highways of Uruzgan province. The Australian military had previously refused to confirm or deny Australian payments to Col. Khan.

CanWest News Service’s Mike Blanchfield and Andrew Mayeda reported in November 2007 that the Canadian military had hired a “General Gulalai” to provide security for an undisclosed forward operating base. Gulalai is a warlord in southern Afghanistan who drove the Taliban out of Kandahar in 2001.

The same reporters revealed that Col. Haji Toorjan, a local warlord allied with Kandahar governor and major warlord Gul Agha Sherzai, was hired to provide security for Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City, where Canada’s provincial construction team is located.

Blanchfeld and Mayeda found that the Canadian military had given 29 contracts worth 1.14 million dollars to a company identified as “Sherzai”, suggesting strongly that the former governor of Kandahar, who had become governor of Nangarhar province, was the owner.

The Canadian military refused to confirm whether Gul Agha Sherzai is indeed the owner.

In Badakhshan province, Gen. Nazri Mahmed, a warlord who is said to “control a significant portion of the province’s lucrative opium industry”, has the contract to provide security for the German Provincial Reconstruction Team, according to the NYU report.

The report suggests that the U.S. and NATO contingents are spending hundreds of millions of dollars annually on contracts with Afghan security providers, most of which are local power brokers guilty of human rights abuses.

In addition to Ahmed Wali Karzai, it names Hashmat Karzai, another brother of President Karzai, and Hamid Wardak, the son of Defence Minister Rahim Wardak, as powerful figures who control private security firms that have gotten security contracts without registering with the government.

Two anonymous United Nations sources cited in the report estimate that 1,000 to 1,500 unregistered armed security groups have been “employed, trained, and armed by ISAF” and “Coalition Forces” for security services. As many as 120,000 armed individuals are estimated by the U.N. sources to belong to about 5,000 private militias in Afghanistan.

Most Afghan warlords are widely reviled, mainly because the private armies they continue to control carry out theft and violence against civilians without any accountability.

In his initial assessment last August, Gen. McChrystal referred to “public anger and alienation” toward ISAF, of which he is commander, as a result of the perception that ISAF is “complicit” in “widespread corruption and abuse of power”.

That remark suggests that McChrystal, who had carried out the Special Forces’ policy of relying on Afghan warlords for security in the past, was now expressing concern about its political consequences.

Jake Sherman, a co-author of the NYU report, was a United Nations political officer involved in the effort to disarm warlords from 2003 to 2005. He is sceptical that U.S. policy ties with the warlords will be ended.

“I don’t see how U.S. and other contingents could sustain forward operating bases without paying these guys,” said Sherman in an interview with IPS.

Beyond their continuing dependence on the warlords for security services, Sherman sees another reason for keeping them on the payroll. If the U.S. and NATO military commanders tried to cut their ties with the private militias, Sherman said the warlords “would actually become a security threat”.

Sherman recalled that during his period working for the United Nations in northern Afghanistan, local police were hired to guard a World Food Programme warehouse in Badakhshan. After a rocket attack on the warehouse, an investigation quickly turned up the fact that the police themselves had carried out the attack to pressure the U.N. to hire more guards.

The present U.S. and NATO dependence on warlord armies is rooted in the policy of the George W. Bush administration in the early years after the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001.

The Central Intelligence Agency put the commanders of the forces who had defeated the Taliban on the payroll and gave them weapons and communications equipment to help U.S. counterterrorism squads locate any al Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan.

The commanders used the U.S. support to consolidate their political control over different provinces or sub-provincial areas. Human Rights Watch observed in a June 2002 report on the new relationships forged between the United States and the warlords, “While the U.S. government does not view this policy as actively supporting local warlords, the distinction is often lost on Afghan civilians who see coalition forces openly interacting with the warlords.”

Larry Goodson of the National War College, who participated in the 2002 process called the Loya Jirga under which the first post-Taliban Afghan government was established, told IPS he had recommended from the beginning a “de-warlordisation” process, in which “we took nasty, sleazy characters and turn them into less nasty, sleazy bosses.”

But the warlords were kept on the payroll, Goodson recalls, mainly because the troops controlled by the former commanders were seen as “force multipliers”, in a situation where foreign troops were in short supply.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist with Inter-Press Service specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, “Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam”, was published in 2006.

The danger of Obama’s dithering

His foreign policy brings to mind Jimmy Carter, or perhaps Ethelred the Unready.

By John R. Bolton

Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challenges elsewhere, because our adversaries carefully follow diminished American resolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether because of uncertainty or internal political struggles, signals that the United States may not respond to international challenges in clear and coherent ways.

Taken together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved historically to be a toxic combination for America’s global interests. That is exactly the combination we now see under President Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama’s campaign and inaugural talk about “extending an open hand” and “engagement,” especially the multilateral variety, isn’t exactly unfolding according to plan. Entirely predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but only a technique. Absent presidential leadership, which at a minimum means clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity, engagement simply embodies weakness and indecision.

Obama is no Harry Truman. At best, he is reprising Jimmy Carter. At worst, the real precedent may be Ethelred the Unready, the turn-of the-first-millennium Anglo-Saxon king whose reputation for indecisiveness and his unsuccessful paying of Danegeld — literally, “Danish tax” — to buy off Viking raiders made him history’s paradigmatic weak leader.

Beyond the disquiet (or outrage for some) prompted by the president’s propensity to apologize for his country’s pre-Obama history, Americans increasingly sense that his administration is drifting from one foreign policy mistake to another. Worse, the current is growing swifter, and the threats more pronounced, even as the administration tries to turn its face away from the world and toward its domestic priorities. Foreign observers, friend and foe alike, sense the same aimlessness and drift. French President Nicolas Sarkozy had to remind Obama at a Sept. 24 U.N. Security Council meeting that “we live in the real world, not a virtual one.”

Examples of weakness abound, and the consequences are readily foreseeable.

Canceling the Polish and Czech missile defense bases is understood in Moscow and Eastern European capitals as backing down in the face of Russian bluster and belligerence. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened the day after our 2008 election to deploy missiles targeting these assets unless they were canceled, a threat duly noted by the Russian media when Obama canceled the sites. Given candidate Obama’s reaction to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war — calling on both sides to exercise restraint — there is little doubt that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s project to re-extend Russian hegemony over as much of the former Soviet Union as he can will continue apace. Why should he worry about Washington?

Obama’s Middle East peace process has stalled, most recently because he set a target for an end to Israeli settlement expansion, couldn’t meet it and then proceeded as though he hadn’t meant what he said originally. By insisting that Israel freeze settlements as a precondition to renewing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Obama drew a clear line. But when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu withstood Obama’s pressure, Obama caved, hosting a photo-op with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas that strengthened Netanyahu and weakened Abbas just when Obama wanted to achieve exactly the opposite. However one views the substantive outcome of this vignette, Obama himself looked the weakest of all. It could well be years before his Middle East policy gets back up off the ground.

On nuclear nonproliferation, North Korea responded to the “open hand” of engagement by testing its second nuclear device, continuing an aggressive ballistic missile testing program, cooperating with other rogue states and kidnapping and holding hostage two American reporters. Obama’s reaction is to press for more negotiations, which simply encourages Pyongyang to up the ante.

Iran is revealed to have been long constructing an undeclared, uninspected nuclear facility that makes a mockery of almost seven years of European Union negotiation efforts. Forced to deal publicly with this deeply worrying threat, Obama proposes the equivalent of money-laundering for nuclear threats: Iranian uranium enriched in open, unambiguous defiance of four Security Council resolutions will be enriched to higher levels in Russia, and then returned to be burned in a Tehran reactor — ostensibly for peaceful purposes. Sarkozy again captured the growing international incredulity in his noteworthy Security Council speech: “I support America’s ‘extended hand.’ But what have these proposals for dialogue produced for the international community? Nothing but more enriched uranium and more centrifuges.”

Finally, Obama’s agonizing, very public reappraisal of his own 7-month-old Afghanistan policy epitomizes indecisiveness. While there is no virtue in sustaining policy merely for continuity’s sake, neither is credit due for too-quickly adopting policies without appreciating the risks entailed and then fleeing precipitously when the risks become manifest. The administration’s stated reason for its policy re-evaluation was widespread fraud in Afghanistan’s Aug. 20 presidential election. But this explanation is simply not credible. Did not the administration’s generals and diplomats on the ground, not to mention United Nations observers, see the election mess coming? Was the Hamid Karzai administration’s cupidity and corruption overlooked or ignored during Obama’s original review and revision of his predecessor’s policy?

The unmistakable inference is that Obama did not carefully think through his March Afghan policy, or did not have full confidence then or now in Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal or Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, or that it is now politically inconvenient among increasingly antiwar Democrats to follow through on that policy.

None of these explanations reflect credit on the president. He is dithering. Whatever decision Obama reaches on Afghanistan, his credibility and leadership have been badly wounded by his continuing public display of indecisiveness.

Our international adversaries undoubtedly welcome all of these “resets” in U.S. foreign policy, but Americans should be appalled at how much of our posture in the world has already been given away. If Obama’s first nine months indicate the direction of the next 39, we still have a long way to fall.

John R. Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of “Surrender Is Not an Option.”

Copyright © 2009, The Los Angeles Times

A Voice Worth Heeding on Afghanistan

By ALBERT R. HUNT

WASHINGTON – Zbigniew Brzezinski says that a central consideration for President Barack Obama, as he faces an agonizing choice over Afghanistan, is what happened to the Russians in the 1980s and after they were driven out in 1989.

Mr. Brzezinski’s views deserve attention. Few policy makers have studied Afghanistan as long; he was President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser during the Soviet invasion of 1979. He has Mr. Obama’s interests at heart – he was a prominent supporter during the presidential campaign – and is the most respected Democratic geopolitical thinker outside the administration.

Thirty years ago, after initial concerns that the Russians would succeed in Afghanistan, it became clear to Mr. Brzezinski that once they were viewed as “occupiers,” they would be thwarted and eventually driven out. He doesn’t want Mr. Obama to make the same mistake with a mindless escalation. Thus, he is skeptical of the request of the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, for as many as 40,000 additional combat troops.

“General McChrystal’s recommendation makes sense in a narrow military framework; he has been given a particular task, to defeat the counterinsurgency,” Mr. Brzezinski says.

“But suppose the counterinsurgency becomes a bigger insurgency,” he goes on. “This is why I’ve been saying let’s not do what the Russians did.”

In short, let’s not get into the nation-building business. “We’ve had some sort of a notion that we build a modern society, democracy, with the help of Western-type Afghans.”

While President George W. Bush “theologized” that concept, “Obama no longer embraces that theology,” Mr. Brzezinski says. “But let’s face it: Two years ago, what did he know about Afghanistan?” The former top national security aide is no soft-liner and thinks it would be a disaster to withdraw from Afghanistan or set deadlines for getting out. That brings up what the United States did after the Russians had to retreat.

“Our biggest mistake was in 1989,” he says. “The Taliban arose not because of what we did in Afghanistan to help defeat the Soviets. They arose because of what we did not do in Afghanistan, which was to continue helping after the Soviets were driven out.” Looking at these Afghanistan bookends, he says Mr. Obama should “draw those two lessons together.”

“We have to stay in Afghanistan politically and economically,” he says, “but at the same time we must not make the war against the Taliban our central preoccupation, thereby giving them the opportunity to label us the way the Soviets became labeled, as enemies of Afghans.”

The Brzezinski view seems strikingly similar to the perspective of another surprising source, the Pakistani intelligence agency. America has long been suspicious of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, which has been infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists. Now, the Obama administration believes that after the Taliban’s march toward Islamabad, there may be a genuine awakening on the terrorism threat in the I.S.I., which had previously been focused almost exclusively on countering India.

Last week, in a fascinating interview, both for the unusual access and the substance, with the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, the top Pakistani intelligence official, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, expressed skepticism about a U.S. troop surge. At the same time, he showed deep concern that the United States would pull back from its commitments in the region.

“The I.S.I. leadership thinks the United States can’t afford to lose in Afghanistan, and it worries about a security vacuum there that would endanger Pakistan,” Mr. Ignatius reported. “But at the same time, the I.S.I. fears that a big military surge, like up to the 40,000 additional troops McChrystal wants, could be counterproductive.”

It can be reliably reported that this also reflects the views of Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, who wants more emphasis on the economic and political development in the region. The Pakistanis are very encouraged by recent congressional action in approving a measure co-sponsored by Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, providing $7.5 billion of economic aid over the next five years.

Mr. Obama has taken on more than a few tough issues this year, though the Afghanistan decision, for the first time, is producing serious fissures among his top policy makers. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and leading Democratic lawmakers are deeply skeptical of the request from General McChrystal, commander of the International Security Assistance Force and of U.S. forces in Afghanistan; most, not all, of the military, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and her high-powered Afghanistan-Pakistan special representative, Richard C. Holbrooke, are sympathetic.

A pivotal figure in this debate, Mr. Brzezinski guesses, will be Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a Bush holdover, who commands considerable respect in Washington. It isn’t clear where Mr. Obama will come down; it will be a surprise, however, if it isn’t somewhere close to where Mr. Gates is.

While opposing a wide-scale escalation, and deeper U.S. involvement, Mr. Brzezinski says “some troop increases may be necessary maybe to hold Kandahar, maybe to hold the main cities in general. But beyond that, where is this sort of dawn in sight in a period of some darkness? I do not see that yet.”

Much of the current revaluation, Mr. Obama’s top advisers say, stems from the discredited August election in Afghanistan and the ineffective president – Hamid Karzai.

Mr. Brzezinski responds that Mr. Karzai may not be a bargain but that to cut him off would be a flawed approach. “If someone says to me, ‘Dump Karzai,’ my question always is, ‘Who do you replace him with?”‘ he says. “We do not ostentatiously pick and dump rulers.”

This line of reasoning, he recalls, makes the increasingly cited analogy to Vietnam more appropriate. In 1963, the United States engineered the removal of President Ngo Dinh Diem; it didn’t produce the desired results. “We dumped Diem without having an alternative,” Mr. Brzezinski says.

The Vietnam analogy remains haunting. On Mr. Obama’s nightstand is Gordon Goldstein’s acclaimed biography of McGeorge Bundy, “Lessons in Disaster,” which describes the flawed decision-making of President Lyndon B. Johnson in the Vietnam quagmire.

Analysts Expect Long-Term, Costly U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan

By Walter Pincus – Washington Post Staff Writer

As the Obama administration expands U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, military experts are warning that the United States is taking on security and political commitments that will last at least a decade and a cost that will probably eclipse that of the Iraq war.

A Marine gunner holds fort as his comrades conduct the raid in Safar Bazaar. The Obama administration is in the process of overhauling the U.S. approach to Afghanistan, and analysts say this will call for significant commitments. (Nikki Kahn – The Washington Post)

Since the invasion of Afghanistan eight years ago, the United States has spent $223 billion on war-related funding for that country, according to the Congressional Research Service. Aid expenditures, excluding the cost of combat operations, have grown exponentially, from $982 million in 2003 to $9.3 billion last year.

The costs are almost certain to keep growing. The Obama administration is in the process of overhauling the U.S. approach to Afghanistan, putting its focus on long-term security, economic sustainability and development. That approach is also likely to require deployment of more American military personnel, at the very least to train additional Afghan security forces.

Later this month, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is expected to present his analysis of the situation in the country. The analysis could prompt an increase in U.S. troop levels to help implement President Obama’s new strategy.

Military experts insist that the additional resources are necessary. But many, including some advising McChrystal, say they fear the public has not been made aware of the significant commitments that come with Washington’s new policies.

“We will need a large combat presence for many years to come, and we will probably need a large financial commitment longer than that,” said Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the “strategic assessment” team advising McChrystal. The expansion of the Afghan security force that the general will recommend to secure the country “will inevitably cost much more than any imaginable Afghan government is going to be able to afford on its own,” Biddle added.

“Afghan forces will need $4 billion a year for another decade, with a like sum for development,” said Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine who has chronicled the Iraq and Afghan wars. Bing said the danger is that Congress is “so generous in support of our own forces today, it may not support the aid needed for progress in Afghanistan tomorrow.”

Some members of Congress are worried. The House Appropriations Committee said in its report on the fiscal 2010 defense appropriations bill that its members are “concerned about the prospects for an open-ended U.S. commitment to bring stability to a country that has a decades-long history of successfully rebuffing foreign military intervention and attempts to influence internal politics.”

The Afghan government has made some political and military progress since 2001, but the Taliban insurgency has been reinvigorated.

Anthony H. Cordesman, another member of McChrystal’s advisory group and a national security expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told reporters recently that even with military gains in the next 12 to 18 months, it would take years to reduce sharply the threat from the Taliban and other insurgent forces.

The task that the United States has taken on in Afghanistan is in many ways more difficult than the one it has encountered in Iraq, where the U.S. government has spent $684 billion in war-related funding.

In a 2008 study that ranked the weakest states in the developing world, the Brookings Institution rated Afghanistan second only to Somalia. Afghanistan’s gross domestic product in 2008 was $23 billion, with about $3 billion coming from opium production, according to the CIA’s World Factbook. Oil-producing Iraq had a GDP of $113 billion.

Afghanistan’s central government takes in roughly $890 million in annual revenue, according to the World Factbook. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has pointed out that Afghanistan’s national budget cannot support the $2 billion needed today for the country’s army and police force.

Dutch Army Brig. Gen. Tom Middendorp, commander of the coalition task force in Afghanistan’s southern Uruzgan province, described the region as virtually prehistoric.

“It’s the poorest province of one of the poorest countries in the world. And if you walk through that province, it’s like walking through the Old Testament,” Middendorp told reporters recently. “There is enormous illiteracy in the province. More than 90 percent cannot write or read. So it’s very basic, what you do there. And they have had 30 years of conflict.”

Unlike in Iraq, where Obama has established a timeline for U.S. involvement, the president has not said when he would like to see troops withdrawn from Afghanistan.

White House officials emphasize that the burden is not that of the United States alone. The NATO-led force in the country has 61,000 troops from 42 countries; about 29,000 of those troops are American.

Still, military experts say the United States will not be able to shed its commitment easily.

The government has issued billions of dollars in contracts in recent years, underscoring the vast extent of work that U.S. officials are commissioning.

Among other purposes, contractors have been sought this summer to build a $25 million provincial Afghan National Police headquarters; maintain anti-personnel mine systems; design and build multimillion-dollar sections of roads; deliver by sea and air billions of dollars worth of military bulk cargo; and supervise a drug-eradication program.

One solicitation, issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, is aimed at finding a contractor to bring together Afghan economic, social, legal and political groups to help build the country’s infrastructure. The contractor would work with Afghan government officials as well as representatives from private and nongovernmental organizations to establish a way to allocate resources for new projects.

“We are looking at two decades of supplying a few billion a year to Afghanistan,” said Michael E. O’Hanlon, a senior fellow and military expert at the Brookings Institution, adding: “It’s a reasonable guess that for 20 years, we essentially will have to fund half the Afghan budget.” He described the price as reasonable, given that it may cost the United States $100 billion this year to continue fighting.

“We are creating a [long-term military aid] situation similar to the ones we have with Israel, Egypt and Jordan,” he said.