The real agenda of the Pakistani Taliban

By: Asad Munir

This is with reference to an article by Ejaz Haider on these pages titled “What is the TTP’s real agenda?” (February 28). Pashtun society is classified into three categories: Pashtuns, Mian Mula (religious functionaries) and Kasabgars (artisans). The leadership in the society has mostly remained with the first category, the Pashtuns. In Fata, the administration and the tribal maliks derive legitimacy and authority from the written laws of the state. The role of the religious functionary is not defined in any law of the land and is restricted to the performance of some religious rituals. However, over the years, he is not content with this role and wants to be an active member of the decision-making body of Pashtun society.

This was realised when, in November 1994, madrassa students, the Taliban as they came to be known, captured Kandahar and, within two years, took control of about 90 per cent of Afghanistan. Also, the distinction between the Pakistani Pashtun Taliban and the Afghan Taliban is not clear or well-defined. This is because, over the centuries, the Pashtun on either side of the Durand Line have never accepted the border. The British were, in fact, aware of this and granted what were called ‘easement rights’ to the tribals for cross-border movement.

Similarly, events in Afghanistan affect Fata and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). To correct the popular perception that the Taliban came to the fore in Pakistan after 9/11, in 1998 a Taliban force had appeared in the Mirali area of North Waziristan. By 1999, they were in control of Mirali and part of Orakzai Agency. Waves of Talibanisation spread to different parts of Fata and KP and, by mid-2000, the torching of video cassettes and TVs, considered as signs of obscenity, were a common sight in parts of KP. After 9/11, the Taliban kept a low profile but resurfaced around 2003.

Their agenda is Pakistan-centric and they exploited the vacuum created by the killings of maliks and the absence of the state’s writ. Since the state did not react, the ordinary tribal had no option but to accept Taliban rule. In February 2005, Baitullah Mehsud signed an agreement pledging that his forces would not cross the border to fight Nato. The Taliban of North Waziristan did the same thing in September 2006.

The agenda of the Taliban is to acquire power and to create their own state in Fata, which they will then extend to other areas of the country. Those who think that the Taliban will lay down their arms once Nato forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and will become law-abiding citizens, are not aware of the ground realities. This will not happen, unless they are forced to surrender.

Taliban say Afghan buildup under way

By KATHY GANNON

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - The Taliban are moving fighters into Kandahar, planting bombs and plotting attacks as NATO and Afghan forces prepare for a summer showdown with insurgents, according to a Taliban commander with close ties to senior insurgent leaders.

NATO and Afghan forces are stepping up operations to push Taliban fighters out of the city, which was the Islamist movement’s headquarters during the years it ruled most of Afghanistan. The goal is to bolster the capability of the local government so that it can keep the Taliban from coming back.

The Taliban commander, who uses the pseudonym Mubeen, told The Associated Press that if military pressure on the insurgents becomes too great “we will just leave and come back after” the foreign forces leave.

Despite nightly raids by NATO and Afghan troops, Mubeen said his movements have not been restricted. He was interviewed last week in the center of Kandahar, seated with his legs crossed on a cushion in a room. His only concession to security was to lock the door.

Kudos for ‘stuffy’ Canada

by Eric Margolis

Some things we learned in 2009:

The global recession that began in America in 2008 was triggered by run amok speculation, failure of government supervision, and massive fraud by accounting and credit rating agencies. The global banking system was within hours of total collapse.

America’s and Britain’s economies were artificially juiced up and distorted by the narcotic of cheap, easy credit. Both are now experiencing painful withdrawal from credit addiction. It’s an ugly sight. Their leaders still call for more massive debt to supposedly cure the disaster caused by too much debt. “Stuffy,” cautious Canada emerged with flying colours.

The financial fraud that ignited the worst recession since the 1930s began under the Clinton administration, then ran rampant during George W. Bush’s two terms. Federal regulators, the media, Congress and U.S. presidents were suborned by Wall Street. Finance became America’s leading industry. Parasitism replaced production.

Millions are out of work. America is crushed by trillions in debt. U.S. global power has taken a staggering beating. Yet the perpetrators of this biggest crime in modern U.S. history and the politicians that allowed it to occur remain unpunished. Wall Street churns obscene, government-financed profits while small investors lost billions. The big money houses should have been broken up by federal trust busters.

President Barack Obama does not walk on water. To worldwide disappointment, his foreign policy is floundering. Obama’s promise to solve the Mideast mess, America’s largest overseas headache, was scorned by Israel, which refused to stop colonizing Palestinian land. Israel made Obama look like a weakling and amateur, and clearly not in command of U.S. Mideast policy.

Those who hoped the U.S. would change course under Obama to play a positive, co-operative, non-imperial role in world affairs were profoundly dismayed.

We see continued occupation of Iraq, the expanded, trillion-dollar war in Afghanistan, military operations in Somalia, West Africa, and now Yemen. The White House stonewalled on releasing torture documents, failed to prosecute the Bush-era’s torturers and kidnappers, and refused to end domestic surveillance. And there have been continued violations of the Geneva Convention.

Military spending has risen from $667 billion US under Bush to $734 billion under Nobel Peace Prize laureate Obama. Add $49.8 billion more for intelligence. The U.S. is bankrupt and living on credit from China.

But Washington’s national security juggernaut keeps rolling on.

Pakistan is fast becoming a huge, very dangerous problem. Its isolated, corrupt, U.S.-backed government in Islamabad is crumbling. The Afghan war is spreading into Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal zones.

The Pentagon can’t wage war in Afghanistan without total Pakistani cooperation. But 95% of Pakistanis oppose the U.S.-led war. Their nation of 168 million seems about to erupt into truly dangerous chaos while India considers deeper intervention in Afghanistan.

Washington’s $15 billion effort to buy its way out of trouble in Pakistan won’t work. Obama has truly stuck his head in the proverbial hornet’s nest. He could have withdrawn it, but chose, instead, to go deeper. The president has only himself and his neocon advisors to blame.

What he and we should have learned is that waging wars without clear strategic or political purpose in the middle of nowhere is a fool’s errand, and a very dangerous, expensive one. Afghanistan, graveyard of empires, may also become the graveyard of Obama’s presidency.

As worldwide concern over environmental pollution grows, our dirtiest secret — the pain and terror we inflict on animals — is beginning to be exposed thanks to animal rights groups.

Over fifty billion animals are slaughtered annually around the globe; 10 billion in the U.S., and 650 million in Canada. Most suffer terribly in industrial pens and hideously cruel slaughter factories hidden from public view. Our mistreatment of animals and factory farming will be one of the next big issues facing the world’s conscience. Shamefully, Canada is a major abuser of animals through sealing, trapping, hunting and factory farming.

The European Union leads the world in humane treatment of animals. We should emulate their civilized lead.

Tempering Afghan Optimism

Donald M. Snow

The recent announcements and statements of support for President Obama’s “surge” in Afghanistan have left me a bit confused, and I wonder if readers can help me out here. Something just does not compute.

The rationale of the surge is, like Iraq, to improve conditions in Afghanistan enough to turn thcountry back over to the Afghans, notably the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police (ANP), sometimes collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The idea is that while additional American forces conduct clear and hold operations to secure and maintain control of parts of the country still under Taliban rule, accelerated training of ANSF will yield anative force capable of fending for itself as the United States begins disengagement in 2011.

This whole plan sounds a great deal like Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization program (as Fareed Zakaria points out in this past week’s Newsweek) or possibly David Petraeus’ Iraqification program of 2007. It will be remembered, of course, that Vietnamization succeeded in providing cover for American withdrawal from Southeast Asia but did not, for a variety of reasons still being debated, result in the desired outcome of a non-communist South Vietnam. The outcome in Iraq, being heralded as a great triumph by some, remains up in the air. Iraqification has provided the cover behind which American withdrawal is occurring; what Iraq will look like after we are gone is a matter of pure conjecture. I am not sanguine we are going to like the final outcome, but that is simply one person’s opinion.

Is that all the additional 30,000 troops are about in Afghanistan? Admitting that President Obama inherited a virtually impossible domestic and international situation in Afghanistan (see my recent post. “Obama and Afghanistan: No Good Choices“), this seems a very modest and questionable outcome. Precedent seems unpromising, so why do we think it will work?

The answer, which gets us to my original concern, is that things are different here than in Vietnam, where the parallel policy failed (other than getting us out). We are told that the major difference is that the Taliban, unlike the National Liberation Front (NLF)/Viet Cong (VC), who had widespread political support, the Taliban are almost universally hated in Afghanistan. One poll that is repeatedly cited suggests a mere 6 percent of Afghans support them. Moreover, the South Vietnamese government never had any real popular support, whereas the government of Hamid Karzai has at least the potential for such support. Hold on here!

If the Taliban are as hated as we now maintain, how have they not only kept going but expanded their power and control? Just a couple months ago, American officials were decrying the “almost inexhaustible” supply of potential Taliban recruits that made suppressing them impossible. What has changed? As best one can tell, very little has changed in terms of the basic structure of political loyalties in the country. The Taliban either does have support in the Afghan population (at least among Pashtuns), or it does not. If it lacks support, it may be possible to isolate and “degrade” it. If not, the likelihood of success of the surge is highly questionable, to put it kindly. Which is it?

The other element is the transformation of the ANSF. Developing a native force capable of defending itself from a threat that has been degraded was central to Vietnamization and Iraqification as well: make the task more manageable. It failed in Vietnam, and the outcome in Iraq is still a work in progress. Why should it work in Afghanistan? The official view is that the ANSFcan indeed be developed and that since Karzai himself is not known to be corrupt, maybe his government can gain legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans. The other side os this argument is that it is exactly the lack of popular support for the regime that has fueled the insurgency all along (as is normally the case in insurgencies). What has changed to make people move to support of the regime? That is not clear.

The current optimism over Afghanistanstarts from, it seems to me, some very shaky assessments about what is happening on the ground there. Three months ago, the Taliban appeared to be a virtually unstoppable juggernaut, and now they are a weak and hated canker sore to be excised. During the recent presidential election, the Afghan regime was a hopelessly corrupt bunch of thieves who could only succeed by stealing the election, and now they are a hopeful beacon for the future of Afghanistan. Is this all public relations? Or has something really changed? Help me out here.

Donald M. Snow, Professor Emeritus at the University of Alabama, is the author of over 40 books on foreign policy, international relations and national security topics. This essay was originally published at his blog What After Iraq? Photo credit: Getty Images.

Tajik grip on Afghan army signals strife

By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON – Contrary to the official portrayal of the Afghan National Army (ANA) as ethnically balanced, the latest data from United States sources reveal that the Tajik minority now accounts for far more ANA troops than the Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group.

The shift in the ethnic composition of ANA troops in recent years is leading to another civil war between the Pashtuns and a Tajik-led anti-Pashtun ethnic coalition, similar to the one that followed the fall of the Soviet-supported regime in 1992, according to some observers.

Tajik domination of the ANA feeds Pashtun resentment over the control of the country’s security institutions by their ethnic rivals, while Tajiks increasingly regard the Pashtun population as aligned with the Taliban.

The leadership of the army has been primarily Tajik since the ANA was organized in 2002, and Tajiks have been over-represented in the officer corps from the beginning. But the original troop composition of the ANA was relatively well-balanced ethnically.

General Karl Eikenberry, then chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, issued guidelines in 2003 to ensure ethnic balance in the ANA, according to Chris Mason, who was a member of the Afghanistan Inter-agency Operations Group from 2003 to 2005. Eikenberry acted after then defense minister Marshall Mohammed Qasim Fahim had packed with Tajiks the first group of ANA recruits to be trained.

The Eikenberry guidelines called for 38% of the troops to be Pashtun, 25% Tajiks, 19% Hazaras and 8% Uzbek.

Since then, US officials have continued to put out figures indicating that the ethnic balance in the ANA was in line with the Eikenberry guidelines. As recently as 2008, the RAND Corporation was given data showing that 40% of the enlisted men in the ANA were Pashtun and that Tajiks accounted for less than 30%.

The latest report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, issued on October 30, shows that Tajiks, which represent 25% of the population, now account for 41% of all ANA troops who have been trained, and that only 30% of the ANA trainees are now Pashtuns.

A key reason for the predominance of Tajik troops is that by mid-2007 the ANA began to have serious problems recruiting troops in the rural areas of Kandahar and Helmand provinces.

At least in the Pashtun province of Zabul, the percentage of Pashtuns in the ANA has now been reduced to a minimum. In Zabul province, US officers embedded in one of the kandaks (battalions) reported earlier this year that they believed only about 5% of the troops in the entire brigade are Pashtuns, according to a report by Army Times correspondent Sean D Naylor published in the Armed Forces Journal last July. The brigade commander in Zabul is a Tajik.

Meanwhile, Tajiks have maintained a firm grip on the command structure of the ANA. Marshall Fahim put commanders from the Tajik-controlled Northern Alliance in key positions within the Ministry of Defense as well as in the ANA command.

Mason recalled that the US thought it had an agreement with President Hamid Karzai under which the command structure of the ANA would be reorganized on the basis of ethnic balance, starting with the top 25 positions. But Karzai never acted on the agreement, Mason said.

Even after Fahim was stripped of his government and military positions by Karzai in 2004, his appointee as ANA chief of staff, General Bismullah Khan, remained as head of the army. Tajiks have continued to occupy the bulk of the positions in the Ministry of Defense.

A United Nations official in Kabul estimated that, as of spring 2008, no less than 70% of all kandaks were commanded by Tajiks, as reported by Italian scholar Antonio Giustozzi.

Even in overwhelmingly Pashtun Zabul province, there are only two Pashtun kandak commanders out of a total of six, Matthew Hoh, the senior US civilian official in Zabul until he submitted his resignation in September in protest against the war, told Inter-Press Service (IPS) in an interview.

Mason views the process by which the ANA is coming to be seen as an increasingly Tajik institution as making a civil war between the Pashtuns and the Tajiks and other ethnic minorities virtually inevitable.

“I believe the elements of a civil war are in play,” Mason told IPS.

Mason said the refusal of Pashtuns in the south and east to join the ANA is part of a “self-reinforcing spiral”. The more Dari, the language spoken by Tajiks, becomes the de facto language of the ANA, said Mason, the more Pashtuns will see it as an alien institution.

“The warlords have already started rearming,” said Mason.

Although the US “has done as good a job as it could have” in trying to make the ANA mirror the broader society, Mason said, it can only “attenuate” rather than prevent such a war in the future, even with a larger troop presence.

Hoh believes a civil war between the Pashtuns and a Tajik-led alliance of ethnic groups has already begun but could get much worse. “It is already bad now,” he said, but unless US policy changes, “we could see a return of the civil war of the 1990s”.

To avoid that outcome would require putting priority on political reconciliation in order to “integrate all elements of society into the Afghan government and security forces”, said Hoh. That, in turn, would require an international framework, probably involving the United Nations, he said.

Hoh recalled a scene he witnessed in Zabul suggesting that Tajik commanders view the ANA as belonging to the Tajik-led Northern Alliance. At an Afghan independence day event at a military base August 19, attended by hundreds of ANA and national police, the large photograph adorning the wall was not of Karzai but of the Tajik commander of the entire Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was assassinated by al-Qaeda two days before the September 11, 2001, attacks.

The previous civil war between Pashtun and Tajik-led armies was triggered by the disappearance in 1992 of the national army of the Soviet-supported Najibullah regime, which had maintained a tenuous balance between the two major ethnic groups.

The collapse of the Najibullah regime and its army was followed immediately by fierce fighting between the Northern Alliance, which had reached Kabul first, and the forces of the Pashtun warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had previously been allied with the non-Pashtun mujahideen against the Soviet-backed regime.

In a sign that Tajik commanders don’t trust Pashtuns in the south and east, the Tajik senior ANA officer in Zabul, Major General Jamaluddin Sayed, dismissed the locally recruited national police in the province as being under Taliban influence and called for recruitment of police from outside the province.

“If we recruit ANP [Afghan National Police] people from Zabul province, probably they have some relationship with the Taliban,” Jamaluddin told Army Times reporter Naylor.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006.

To Pentagon’s Pakistani Adviser Ahmed Rashid: What’s Wrong With Pakistan’s Interests?

The famous Afghan expert is now peddling his Pentagon bias as fair analysis. My question to him is this: fine if you justify US interest, but what’s wrong if Pakistan has its interests too?

By AHMED QURAISHI
WWW.AHMEDQURAISHI.COM

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan-Mr. Ahmed Rashid’s part-time job as an advisor to the US military on Afghanistan is beginning to overshadow his otherwise impeccable analysis.

As a journalist, Mr. Ahmed Rashid witnessed firsthand in Afghanistan the intrigues by several nations inside that country during the 1980s and ’90s.

But here, in his BBC.com article titled, Pakistan conspiracy theories stifle debate , Mr. Rashid insists that the entire mess in Pakistan is self-inflicted and is free of any outside interest and influence.

His close contacts with Washington, and especially with the military establishment there, should not blind him to the clear signs of how Afghan soil is being used against Pakistan, and against its military to be more precise, in retaliation for the twisted perception that Pakistan is somehow behind the Afghan Taliban resurgence and the resulting US military and intelligence failures in that country.

While owning our part of the mess, we in Pakistan need to be very clear on those parts of the mess that the United States is responsible for.

Washington began its double game with Pakistan immediately after overthrowing the Afghan Taliban government.

The United States worked from the start to create a very anti-Pakistan setup in Kabul. The Indians have been given a lot of space in Afghanistan. In fact, parts of the US intelligence and military decided quite early in the Afghan campaign that Indian ‘expertise’ will shape American views on Afghanistan and on how to deal with Pakistan, in itself the first breach on the part of US over what was supposed to be a Pakistani-American alliance to stabilize Afghanistan. The composition of the puppet Afghan government, the collective punishment against the Pashtuns, and the way things panned out in the country over the past seven years support this conclusion.

Of course, the word ‘signs’ is an understatement now considering the piles of hard evidence that Pakistani political and military officials have been confronting the Americans with recently. This evidence proves American culpability in not only messing up Afghanistan but also Pakistan. This evidence includes material that shows how the Indians and Mr. Karzai’s spymasters create and support terrorism against Pakistan. It also shows how CIA is turning a blind eye, and in some other instances actually supports terrorism inside Pakistan.

Yes, Pakistan and Pakistanis are responsible for creating a weak state, burdened by an unworkable form of democracy. We Pakistanis have created a situation that is now providing several openings for outsiders to wreak havoc inside our country and manipulate our politics.

The February 2008 elections in Pakistan could have been an opportunity for Pakistanis to reassert themselves and chart out a new course in domestic and foreign policies. Here again the United States and the United Kingdom colluded to force on Pakistanis one of the most corrupt and inept governments in the country’s history.

As such, Washington and London are responsible for the latest political mess in Pakistan, since both helped create a secret ‘deal’ that resulted in forming a Pakistani government led by a dream team of Pakistan’s most corrupt individuals.

Ethnic or religious insurgencies never existed in Pakistan before 2004. These insurgencies surfaced and gained momentum thanks to the mess in Afghanistan and the intrigues of some of our so called allies and friends.

This anti-Pakistan wave of terrorism armed and financed from the Afghan soil has an objective: the Pakistani military.

Pakistani military is too big and too strong for American and British plans for the region. In these plans, India is supposed to provide cheap or low cost soldiers and

For Mr. Rashid to simply dismiss legitimate Pakistani grievances is absurd, to say the least.

The second part of his op-ed is a passionate and at times desperate defense of the PPP government in Islamabad. Nothing surprising here. This government is even more pro-US than the Musharraf government. Mr. Rashid, of course, believes that any US plans for Afghanistan and the region supersede any conflicting – but legitimate – Pakistani interests.

By defending this Pakistani government and dismissing the legitimate Pakistani grievances that run contrary to US interest, Mr. Rashid betrays his own political bias, which he tries in this op-ed to peddle as fair and balanced analysis.

Pakistanis are fed up with fighting other people’s wars and conforming to other people’s agendas in the region.

Pakistan has its own agenda. This Pakistani agenda is rising up from this mess and is making itself felt in multiple ways. And this agenda will eventually supersede anything that foreign powers try to impose through unnatural means. It is better for Mr. Rashid and those who share his views to understand this before it is too late.

Please Send More Than Troops

If the window closes to fix Afghanistan’s government, more boots on the ground won’t matter.

BY ASHRAF GHANI

The end of Afghanistan’s election last week leaves the Barack Obama administration with a narrow window of opportunity to implement a new strategy. While much attention has been paid to such questions as troop levels and counterinsurgency tactics, real success will depend on much less tangible things: personal security, economic growth, and better governance on the ground. Only a strategy aimed at this political progress — as much as military gains — has any chance of success.

Now is the time to implement a framework for progress that focuses on protecting civilians, institutionalizing good governance, and spurring economic growth. It will take hard work and even tougher decisions on the part of both the NATO troops and the Afghan government. The risks of further engagement are grave, but there are several reasons why the time is ripe for such a strategy to finally take root.

Opponents of the war in Afghanistan argue that the International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF’s) mission is fundamentally flawed because Afghans, and Pushtuns particularly, simply don’t want foreign forces on their land. This is not true. For years as finance minister, I watched as tribal leaders came to the government to ask for more foreign troops. What they wanted then and still want now is security, justice, and a military operation that does not endanger civilians.

Indeed, one of the few positive outcomes of August’s presidential election has been an emerging Afghan national consensus on the need for good governance, peace, and reconciliation. As a result, the aspirations of the Afghan people coincide more than ever before with the objectives of President Obama: security and development.

Both Afghans and the international community today share a better understanding of the urgency of rule of law, justice, economic activity, and reconciliation than they have since the start of the war. Even the ISAF has acknowledged that good governance is a prerequisite for peace. ISAF Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s recent strategy report concluded that the illegal behavior of government officials and its cronies poses as much of a threat to the future of Afghanistan as the violent insurgency.

Internationally there are also positive signs that major global players are taking the threat of al Qaeda more seriously, and significant cooperation can be achieved. Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia have said they can agree to the Saudi proposal to work together to defeat the insurgency. As articulated by Prince Turki, that proposal argues that it is necessary to differentiate between al Qaeda and the Taliban. While al Qaeda should be treated as a common, global enemy, the Taliban should be treated separately, as a more manageable domestic challenge for Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia’s position of leadership in the Muslim world brings badly needed legitimacy to a new counter insurgency and peace and reconciliation plan.

Perhaps most important of all, the joint action by global powers is finally helping persuade Pakistani decision-makers to take a more pro-active, constructive role in regional security. Already communication and coordination has improved between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zadari, as recent military initiatives in South Waziristan have shown. Faced by a coherent front, Afghanistan can now become an ally, not just a liability.

Economic development will of course be vital to sustaining security gains. After narcotics have helped cripple the economy, there is a sense abroad that Afghanistan is destined to be poor and needs to be rescued. In reality, Afghanistan has the natural resource wealth to sustain itself. The U.S. Geological Survey has confirmed large deposits of iron, copper, gold, gas, and several gemstones under the country’s soil. Afghans are ready to do business with the world but are held back by insecurity.

The failures of the last eight years, on top of a legacy of 30 years of conflict, will pose formidable challenges to any strategy. The Afghan public is losing confidence both in its government and in the international community, as even ISAF has acknowledged. The former mistrust is the result of the government cutting deals with warlords, tolerating corruption and injustice, and failing to deliver basic services. The latter is the result of the ineffectiveness and corruption of foreign assistance and civilian casualties.

Despite talk of coordination and good intentions, foreign assistance, with few exceptions, has been generally ineffective. The United Nations’ refusal to publish the results of its agencies’ work has cost it credibility. U.S. indictments of a U.N. official and U.S. military contractors for corruption have only reinforced skepticism of foreign motives.

Only an Afghan administration truly committed to good governance will have any success against these challenges. The international community should therefore help design a five-year road map of governance in Afghanistan that lays out mechanisms for restoring the country’s full sovereignty through the building-up of strong, transparent state institutions. Meanwhile, the Afghan government should lay out its framework for national peace-building and cooperation with ISAF.

Rules of governance must be enforced, while limits must be imposed on government officials and elites. Oversight of foreign aid and extractive industries must be created to ensure accountability and efficiency. Government credibility requires both an ability to listen to grievances and the mechanisms for resolving them. Ordinary civilians should be the center of gravity of the state and the international forces.

The debate over Gen. McChrystal’s proposed strategy has been reduced to the number of troops, but the issue is more complex. Military success will depend not simply on troop levels, but on political victory in creating security, governance, development, and peace.

Peshawer—A New Twist

Fatima Rizvi

The massive bomb blast in Peshawer that killed a hundred people and injured hundreds more is a deviation from the TTP (Tehrik Taliban Pakistan) pattern of attacks. The TTP/Al Qaeda has not deliberately targeted civilians and certainly not women and children. They have invariably targeted military personnel, security personnel, intelligence assets, political leaders and government installations and buildings. They have carried out armed attacks and suicide bombings. The Peshawer attack used a vehicle borne explosive device detonated by remote control. It was meant to kill civilians—women and children-to spread fear and destabilize. It may be too early to reach a conclusion but it suits an entity that seeks to destabilize Pakistan and spark ethnic and religious violence. Besides the TTP the focus should shift to those who operate under the shadow of the TTP.

The US presence in Afghanistan and their operations against Pashtuns are the trigger for the Taliban-Al Qaeda nexus and the Afghan resistance against US presence. The Afghan government is dominated by no-Pashtuns and is a close ally of India and the US. India has a big presence in Afghanistan because of Afghan government sponsorship and US silence on the issue. US and India are allies with a Civilian Nuclear Technology Agreement between them and many other areas of cooperation. Pakistanis see the US-Afghan Government-India combine and conclude that India and Afghan Government are colluding in a pro-active policy to destabilize Pakistan. Pashtuns are predominantly in Southern Afghanistan and the western provinces of Pakistan and US policy of military aggression and drone attacks has alienated them. It is within this broader context that we should see the US-Pakistan alliance and the current operations in Waziristan and the terrorism within Pakistan.

Read Complete Article : http://fatimarizvi.newsvine.com/_news/2009/10/29/3441824-peshawer-a-new-twist-

Pakistan’s Civil Society Still Needs U.S. Support

Jamsheed K. Choksy

As part of the recently signed Kerry-Lugar Bill authorizing $7.5 billion in economic assistance for Pakistan over the next five years, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. State Department will be expected to “assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government” in Pakistan, as outlined in the draft metrics for evaluating progress in Pakistan presented by the Obama administration to Congress in September. The goal is to enhance Pakistan’s local capacity for sustainable communal and economic growth so that counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts can be successful. Rebuilding civil society will be even more important as a bulwark against militancy once the Pakistani military’s current offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan ends.

Yet, simultaneously, a major reorientation in U.S. policy toward Pakistan is underway, with the planning, administration, and staffing of reconstruction projects being handed over to the government of Pakistan and to private Pakistani organizations. U.S. officials hope this will both reduce Pakistanis’ negative reactions to foreign aid, and safeguard American civilians by removing them from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

There is no doubt that both social reconstruction and enhanced security is desperately needed in the FATA and NWFP, where local populations still face intimidation from armed Islamic terrorists. Economic opportunities have declined, leaving approximately 60 percent of the FATA’s 5 million inhabitants and 20 percent of the NWFP’s 17.5 million residents below the poverty level. Literacy has fallen to 17.4 percent in the FATA and 49 percent in the NWFP, because militants have destroyed secular schools.

What remains uncertain is whether local Pakistani organizations have the expertise and capacity to implement development efficiently, especially after the current fighting ends.

Indeed, Pakistani and foreign aid workers as well as officials of the FATA and NWFP are concerned by the possibility of unregulated and poorly directed funding. They are convinced that on-site U.S. guidance is necessary in addition to financial assistance. A senior USAID economist stated that lack of American involvement would “seriously compromise” reconstruction efforts. It seems that the U.S. is tossing Pakistan’s government a proverbial bone — control over billions of dollars of aid-related funds in exchange for advancing American counterinsurgency priorities in the country.

Is the trade-off worthwhile?

The increasing absence of USAID personnel and subcontractors is bemoaned by Pashtuns as a “terrible success” for the Taliban and al-Qaida, for it gives the impression that the militants have run the Americans out of town. So despite the security risks, the U.S. needs to demonstrate to skeptical Pakistanis that bilateral partnerships are based upon engagement at the local level, rather than upon directions from afar. As important, U.S. agencies must utilize official Pakistani security resources plus locally provided residential and administrative areas, rather than creating neocolonial expatriate enclaves.

But contrary to those who tout only the dangers, USAID and its subcontractors have demonstrated some success at ensuring that civil society development projects benefit both Pakistan and the U.S.

Over 100,000 micro-enterprises (.pdf) were established in the NWFP by USAID to ensure economic independence from militants. Skilled and unskilled workers in the NWFP and FATA who receive civil society-related employment have commented that they do not object to salaries being paid through U.S.-funded projects. Rather, they value being able to “feed, clothe, and shelter” their families “without shedding blood.”

As importantly, where missteps have occurred, American aid workers with on-site experience have worked with Pakistani officials to correct them. So, for example, the U.S. currently does not brand aid to the FATA and NWFP, in the belief that this protects staff and beneficiaries from terrorist retaliation. However, since many local residents surmise correctly that the aid delivered by the government of Pakistan originates with USAID, the attempt to limit visibility has contributed to baseless suspicion of American attempts to colonize Pakistan. Local Pakistani and American representatives are working to correct this, realizing that far from fanning suspicion, transparency will mitigate the rumor-fueled resistance to foreign assistance that has been building within Pakistan recently.

Another error is the routine refusal by U.S. administrations to requests for educational development by Pakistani Muslim clerics, for fear of assets falling into Taliban and al-Qaida hands. Local officials and American contractors realize that Washington’s fears are misguided and misplaced. Their field experience indicates that extending clearly labeled aid to carefully chosen madrasas would highlight how American resources are utilized in partnership with the Pakistani government and Muslim institutions, in ways that not only are not anti-Muslim but that benefit mainstream Islam and Pakistan.

Most important, because the government and people of Pakistan are finally accepting the challenges of counteracting militancy, it is vital that the U.S. administration respect local sovereignty. The slightest involvement of American troops and security contractors from private organizations would undercut Pakistanis’ fierce sense of nationalism, and so facilitate the spread of anti-American sentiments by Islamic militants.

If the Pakistani government and peace-seeking citizens are slowly winning the battle for the hearts and minds of FATA and NWFP’s residents, it is through the reconstruction of civil society and not through warfare alone. And U.S. assistance for incorporating the FATA and NWFP back into Pakistani civil society has been the key to the recent successes.

Sustaining positive outcomes, however, requires cautious policy, tactful engagement, and constant consultation — not just between senior officials but also with those actually working in the NWFP and FATA. Militaries can win battles, but only society can ensure stability. Given the aid allocation over the next five years, an American withdrawal from direct engagement in Pakistan’s societal development will squander a unique opportunity to get things right.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, Indian, Iranian, Islamic, and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. He has conducted research in Pakistan since 1984. The views expressed are his own.

Pakistan’s Civil Society Still Needs U.S. Support

Jamsheed K. Choksy

As part of the recently signed Kerry-Lugar Bill authorizing $7.5 billion in economic assistance for Pakistan over the next five years, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. State Department will be expected to “assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government” in Pakistan, as outlined in the draft metrics for evaluating progress in Pakistan presented by the Obama administration to Congress in September. The goal is to enhance Pakistan’s local capacity for sustainable communal and economic growth so that counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts can be successful. Rebuilding civil society will be even more important as a bulwark against militancy once the Pakistani military’s current offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan ends.

Yet, simultaneously, a major reorientation in U.S. policy toward Pakistan is underway, with the planning, administration, and staffing of reconstruction projects being handed over to the government of Pakistan and to private Pakistani organizations. U.S. officials hope this will both reduce Pakistanis’ negative reactions to foreign aid, and safeguard American civilians by removing them from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

There is no doubt that both social reconstruction and enhanced security is desperately needed in the FATA and NWFP, where local populations still face intimidation from armed Islamic terrorists. Economic opportunities have declined, leaving approximately 60 percent of the FATA’s 5 million inhabitants and 20 percent of the NWFP’s 17.5 million residents below the poverty level. Literacy has fallen to 17.4 percent in the FATA and 49 percent in the NWFP, because militants have destroyed secular schools.

What remains uncertain is whether local Pakistani organizations have the expertise and capacity to implement development efficiently, especially after the current fighting ends.

Indeed, Pakistani and foreign aid workers as well as officials of the FATA and NWFP are concerned by the possibility of unregulated and poorly directed funding. They are convinced that on-site U.S. guidance is necessary in addition to financial assistance. A senior USAID economist stated that lack of American involvement would “seriously compromise” reconstruction efforts. It seems that the U.S. is tossing Pakistan’s government a proverbial bone — control over billions of dollars of aid-related funds in exchange for advancing American counterinsurgency priorities in the country.

Is the trade-off worthwhile?

The increasing absence of USAID personnel and subcontractors is bemoaned by Pashtuns as a “terrible success” for the Taliban and al-Qaida, for it gives the impression that the militants have run the Americans out of town. So despite the security risks, the U.S. needs to demonstrate to skeptical Pakistanis that bilateral partnerships are based upon engagement at the local level, rather than upon directions from afar. As important, U.S. agencies must utilize official Pakistani security resources plus locally provided residential and administrative areas, rather than creating neocolonial expatriate enclaves.

But contrary to those who tout only the dangers, USAID and its subcontractors have demonstrated some success at ensuring that civil society development projects benefit both Pakistan and the U.S.

Over 100,000 micro-enterprises (.pdf) were established in the NWFP by USAID to ensure economic independence from militants. Skilled and unskilled workers in the NWFP and FATA who receive civil society-related employment have commented that they do not object to salaries being paid through U.S.-funded projects. Rather, they value being able to “feed, clothe, and shelter” their families “without shedding blood.”

As importantly, where missteps have occurred, American aid workers with on-site experience have worked with Pakistani officials to correct them. So, for example, the U.S. currently does not brand aid to the FATA and NWFP, in the belief that this protects staff and beneficiaries from terrorist retaliation. However, since many local residents surmise correctly that the aid delivered by the government of Pakistan originates with USAID, the attempt to limit visibility has contributed to baseless suspicion of American attempts to colonize Pakistan. Local Pakistani and American representatives are working to correct this, realizing that far from fanning suspicion, transparency will mitigate the rumor-fueled resistance to foreign assistance that has been building within Pakistan recently.

Another error is the routine refusal by U.S. administrations to requests for educational development by Pakistani Muslim clerics, for fear of assets falling into Taliban and al-Qaida hands. Local officials and American contractors realize that Washington’s fears are misguided and misplaced. Their field experience indicates that extending clearly labeled aid to carefully chosen madrasas would highlight how American resources are utilized in partnership with the Pakistani government and Muslim institutions, in ways that not only are not anti-Muslim but that benefit mainstream Islam and Pakistan.

Most important, because the government and people of Pakistan are finally accepting the challenges of counteracting militancy, it is vital that the U.S. administration respect local sovereignty. The slightest involvement of American troops and security contractors from private organizations would undercut Pakistanis’ fierce sense of nationalism, and so facilitate the spread of anti-American sentiments by Islamic militants.

If the Pakistani government and peace-seeking citizens are slowly winning the battle for the hearts and minds of FATA and NWFP’s residents, it is through the reconstruction of civil society and not through warfare alone. And U.S. assistance for incorporating the FATA and NWFP back into Pakistani civil society has been the key to the recent successes.

Sustaining positive outcomes, however, requires cautious policy, tactful engagement, and constant consultation — not just between senior officials but also with those actually working in the NWFP and FATA. Militaries can win battles, but only society can ensure stability. Given the aid allocation over the next five years, an American withdrawal from direct engagement in Pakistan’s societal development will squander a unique opportunity to get things right.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, Indian, Iranian, Islamic, and International studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. He has conducted research in Pakistan since 1984. The views expressed are his own.

The Case Against a Surge

More troops won’t solve Afghanistan.

Fareed Zakaria

At the heart of Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s request for a major surge in troops is the assumption that we are failing in Afghanistan. But are we really? The United States has had one central objective: to deny Al Qaeda the means to reconstitute, train, and plan major terror attacks. This mission has been largely successful for the past eight years. Al Qaeda is dispersed, on the run, and unable to direct attacks of the kind it planned and executed routinely in the 1990s. Fourteen of the top 20 leaders of the group have been killed by drone attacks. Its funding sources are drying up, and its political appeal is at an all-time low. All this is not an accident but rather a product of the U.S. presence in the region and efforts to disrupt terrorists, track funds, gain intelligence, aid development, help allies, and kill enemies.

It’s true that the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. While it is nothing like Iraq in 2006-civilian deaths are a 10th as numerous-parts of the country are effectively controlled by the Taliban. Other parts are no man’s land. But these areas are sparsely populated tracts of countryside. All the major population centers remain in the hands of the Kabul government. Is it worth the effort to gain control of all 35,000 Afghan villages scattered throughout the country? That goal has eluded most Afghan governments for the last 200 years and is a very high bar to set for the U.S. mission there.

Why has security gotten worse? Largely because Hamid Karzai’s government is ineffective and corrupt and has alienated large numbers of Pashtuns, who have migrated to the Taliban. It is not clear that this problem can be solved by force, even using a smart counterinsurgency strategy. In fact, more troops injected into the current climate could provoke an antigovernment or nationalist backlash.

It’s important to remember that the crucial, lasting element of the surge in Iraq was not the influx of troops, but getting Sunni tribes to switch sides by offering them security, money, and a place at the table. U.S. troops are now drawing down, and yet-despite some violence-the Sunnis have not resumed fighting because Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is courting their support.

The United States and the Afghan government need to make much greater efforts to wean Pashtun tribes away from the most radical Taliban factions. It is unclear how many Taliban fighters believe in a global jihadist ideology, but most U.S. commanders with whom I’ve spoken feel that the number is less than 30 percent. The other 70 percent are driven by money, gangland peer pressure, or opposition to Karzai.

And when we think through our strategy in Afghanistan, let’s please remember that there is virtually no Qaeda presence there. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen recently acknowledged what U.S. intelligence and all independent observers have long said: Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, as is the leadership of the hard-core Afghan Taliban. (That’s why it’s called the Quetta Shura, Quetta being a Pakistani city.) All attacks against Western targets that have emanated from the region in the past eight years have come from Pakistan and not Afghanistan. Even the most recently foiled plot in the United States, which involved the first Afghan that I know of to be implicated in global terrorism, originated in Pakistan. Yet we spend $30 in Afghanistan for every dollar in Pakistan.

There’s little evidence that Pakistan’s generals have truly accepted that they must defeat all the jihadis in their country (as opposed to just those who threaten the Pakistani state). But they have been more cooperative and active in the past year than ever before. A civilian government, the jihadi takeover of the Swat Valley, a change in public attitudes, and increased American aid have all contributed to a more effective U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Greater energy, attention, and resources will surely yield even more.

What about the argument that Osama bin Laden and his minions will simply shift back across the border if the Taliban is allowed free rein? Well, they haven’t done so yet, despite the pockets of turf the insurgents control. And it is easier for us to deny them territory than to insist that we control it all ourselves-we can fight like guerrillas too. Remember that the U.S. and its allies have close to 100,000 troops in Afghanistan now. Keeping them there is the right commitment, one that keeps in mind the stakes, but also the costs and, most important, the other vital interests around the world to which U.S. foreign policy must also be attentive.

Fareed Zakaria is editor of NEWSWEEK International and author of The Post-American World and The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad .

Obama can’t downsize to success in Afghanistan

By Max Boot

During last year’s campaign, Barack Obama stressed that while he wanted to withdraw from Iraq, he was no pacifist. “As president,” he said on July 15, 2008, “I will make the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban the top priority that it should be. This is a war that we have to win.”

He began to make good on his word on March 27 when he announced a “comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan” that included 21,000 additional troops. The goal, he said, was to “reverse the Taliban’s gains” and “prevent Afghanistan from becoming the Al Qaeda safe haven that it was before 9/11.”

On Aug. 30, the president’s handpicked commander in Afghanistan delivered a plan to do just that. Implementing his counterinsurgency strategy, Gen. Stanley McChrystal wrote, “requires more forces.” If extra troops are not sent, and soon, the “likely result” would be “failure.”

One would expect, based on his past statements, that Obama would rush to give McChrystal the forces needed to win what the president described in August as a “war of necessity.” Yet that’s not the case. The White House has been sitting on the general’s report for a month, refusing to allow him to submit his resource request or testify to Congress and leaking to the news media that the president may decide to downsize the entire war effort.

Why this sudden hesitation after so many months of resolute rhetoric? Surely the president cannot be getting cold feet simply because of rising American casualties. Losses are tragic but expected in a tough fight.

Maybe he’s panicking over falling public support for the war, especially among his liberal base. Yet this war remains far more popular than the one in Iraq was in 2006 when President George W. Bush approved the “surge.” If Obama asks for more troops, Congress is unlikely to oppose him.

Perhaps the fraud-marred presidential election has caused Obama to doubt whether it’s possible to build a legitimate government in Kabul. That’s a real concern, but it is being addressed by the Afghan electoral authorities, who are reexamining ballots cast in hundreds of precincts where fraud was alleged. Even if President Hamid Karzai ultimately prevails, that’s hardly the end of the world. He remains popular with many Afghans, especially the Pashtuns, who make up the base of the insurgency. He has at least as much credibility as Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki did in 2007 at the start of the surge, and he can increase his support still further if he does a better job of delivering basic services and fighting corruption — something coalition forces can push for if they receive more resources.

Admittedly, improving governance will be a tough task. The same may be said of the other “lines of operation” that McChrystal’s strategy envisions, from growing the Afghan security forces to improving population security, strategic communications and detainee operations. But what’s the alternative?

Vice President Joe Biden favors a smaller-scale strategy that would employ high-tech weapons and special forces to kill terrorists from afar. But such a strategy has rarely, if ever, succeeded. It has been employed by Israel against Hamas and Hezbollah. The result: Hamas controls Gaza, and Hezbollah controls southern Lebanon. It has been employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The result: The Taliban controls western Pakistan and large swaths of eastern and southern Afghanistan.

There is no reason to expect, given its long record of failure, that this strategy will work, and no one knows that better than McChrystal, who was in charge of special operations forces hunting terrorists in Iraq for years. Such operations are useful but not decisive, because terrorist leaders can always be replaced. Only by placing security forces among the population can a government prevent terrorists from creating havens.

In Afghanistan today, that must be a job primarily for NATO because the Afghan security forces are simply too small. Afghanistan is bigger in area and population than Iraq, yet its army and police are less than one-third the size of Iraq’s (170,000 versus 600,000). Sending more U.S. troops today can push the insurgents back and create breathing room for the expansion of the Afghan forces.

Conversely, if we start downsizing, our NATO allies are sure to beat us to the exits. The result will be the further unraveling of security in Afghanistan. In such an environment, it is hard to know how we could generate the intelligence needed to successfully target terrorists or the stability needed to train Afghan forces. The presence of American trainers or special forces requires a substantial support base to keep supply lines open, safeguard bases and rescue Americans who are in danger of being overrun.

Gains for the Taliban would be not only a human rights disaster but a strategic disaster, because of the close links between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As a little-noticed passage in McChrystal’s leaked report notes: “Al Qaeda’s links with HQN [the Haqqani network, one of the leading insurgent groups] have grown, suggesting that expanding HQN control could create a favorable environment for AQAM [Al Qaeda and associated movements] to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan.”

We do not have to create “Jeffersonian democracy” in Afghanistan. But we do have to keep it from becoming a terrorist haven. The only way to achieve that minimal objective is with a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. If Obama blinks now, he will be doing grave damage not only to U.S. security but to his own credibility.

Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author, most recently, of “War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today.”

Indian red rag in Afghanistan

Daily Times

The top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, in his latest situation report to President Barack Obama, has suggested the scaling back of India’s “influence” in Afghanistan. In his opinion this Indian factor is “jeopardising US efforts to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda extremists”.

In the chapter about “external influences”, he also talks about Pakistan and Iran, the former providing safe havens to Al Qaeda while its ISI “is aiding the Taliban”; the latter is blamed for using its Al Quds force to “train and arm elements of the Taliban”. The report also reveals that “the US has been asking India to scale back its operations in Afghanistan, urging it to shut down some of its ‘consulates’ located in the areas where India has no major economic interests”.

General McChrystal thinks that the growing Indian political and economic influence in Afghanistan “is likely to exacerbate regional tensions”. This is clearly a reference to Pakistan whose Afghan policy is greatly influenced by the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan. The burden of his message to President Obama, in addition to the increase in troops he has demanded, is that India must downsize if Pakistan’s cooperation is to continue in Afghanistan.

One must be clear in one’s mind that in many ways the mess in Afghanistan is actually a spillover of the Indo-Pak conflict in the region of South Asia. Pakistan’s policy of “strategic depth”, which climaxed with the hijack of an Indian airliner to Kandahar in 1999, was in reaction to the unresolved dispute over Kashmir which created the “threat of India” that Pakistan felt “from the east”. Even today, as Pakistan struggles against the Taliban, 80 percent of its army is stationed on the Indian border.

Afghanistan has traditionally used India as “a potential counterweight in its relationship with Pakistan”. After Pakistan backed the Pashtun Taliban in the mid-1990s, New Delhi provided assistance to the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Masoud comprising Tajik and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups. The current Karzai government is soft on the assistance it is getting from India while using the Indian presence in Afghanistan as a countervailing factor against Pakistan.

Since 2001, India has committed $1.2 billion for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, becoming the largest regional donor to the country. It is helped in this penetration by its good relations with the states of Central Asia; and Iran with whom it collaborates on projects inside Afghanistan considered hostile to its interests by Pakistan. Consequently an isolated Pakistan thinks that India’s establishment of an air base in Farkhor, Tajikistan, is part of an Indian strategy of encirclement.

Since Tajikistan is run by an Uzbek elite, the growing Indian presence in the regional neighbourhood is also seen as being backed by Russia. Farkhor is the first Indian military airbase overseas, and “is convenient for transportation of men and material to and from Afghanistan”. Pakistan can hardly respond adequately to this challenge except that it can resume the cross-border proxy war it had given up and make India pay a price for its checkmating move in Afghanistan.

Therefore, it looks that instead of normalising their relations, India and Pakistan may escalate their conflict. The Afghanistan imbroglio will not be sorted out if this conflict heats up. Islamabad knows that despite its support to the non-Pashtuns of Afghanistan, India can hardly fight a war and win where the US and NATO think they are losing. Perversely, some in Pakistan might strategise their next moves based on the thinking that India will get its comeuppance in Afghanistan once the US and NATO leave Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, India is a red rag in Afghanistan. But the solution of this complication lies not in starting up another proxy war but to move quickly to defuse the tension and normalise relations. Being close together, India and Pakistan can harm each other easily, but it would be wiser to recognise the vulnerabilities shared by both and come together synergetically to benefit from each other’s strength.

The Indo-Pak normalisation of relations is also important because getting India to “rationalise” its presence in Afghanistan is going to be difficult for President Obama. As long as there are tensions between the two countries, the problem in Afghanistan is going to become more compounded. Pakistan can live with Uzbekistan and Iran wielding more clout in Kabul, but not with India staring down the Durand Line which is not even properly demarcated.

The ball is in India’s court. It must stop putting pre-conditions on the resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan. Also, the dialogue should come to grips with conflict resolution not just on the Eastern border but also on the Western border of Pakistan. The proxy wars must end.

Is Afghanistan the next Vietnam?

Harinder Sekhon

Barack Obama campaigned like an anti-war Presidential candidate, but on assuming power was confronted with the reality that the West’s position in Afghanistan had become intractable – same that Nixon faced in Vietnam?

Afghanistan is proving to be one of Barack Obama’s toughest foreign policy challenges. Eight years after the US, along with its NATO allies, intervened in Afghanistan, the situation there only seems to have got grimmer and parallels are being drawn between Afghanistan and America’s war in Vietnam. “Could Afghanistan become Obama’s Vietnam?” wrote Peter Baker in a New York Times article last week. Though he agrees that historical analogies are “overly simplistic and fatally flawed,” he has set in motion a major debate on the subject.

Just a few months back, at the time of his inauguration, Obama was being hailed as a Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D Roosevelt rolled into one, who would usher in a ‘new deal’ that would see the resurgence of the US after eight years of what many saw as the flawed policies of George W Bush. The moment was projected as one of those once-in-a generation occurrences and perhaps expectations from Obama were unrealistically high.

Obama acquired the image of an anti-war candidate in the election campaign. However, Presidents, after taking the oath, often confront situations that they do not always either anticipate, or discover, as perhaps Obama did once he assumed office, that there is not much room for maneuverability in foreign affairs. This perhaps accounts for his opting for the “status quo” on the foreign policy front. He gave support for continued NATO expansion as well as maintaining American garrisons around the globe.

“But his escalation in Afghanistan most obviously demonstrates that he is a man of the interventionist left,” says Doug Bandow of the Washington DC-based CATO Institute. Obama’s second 100 days in office have also seen his popularity decline below the 50 per cent mark in July mainly on account of two factors, dissatisfaction with his handling of the economy, especially healthcare and the environment issues, and the manner in which the war in Afghanistan is being conducted.

According to Peter Baker, “In this summer of discontent for Mr Obama, as the heady early days give way to the grinding battle for elusive goals, he looks ahead to an uncertain future not only for his legislative agenda but for what has indisputably become his war.”

There was general optimism when the Obama administration declared its Af-Pak policy on March 27, 2009. The core strategic goal to “disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda and to eliminate the safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan” seemed attainable given the popular support that the new administration enjoyed at that time. All that seems to have changed. According to the Stanford University historian, David Kennedy, as quoted in the NYT, President Obama is concerned that Afghanistan could yet ‘hijack’ his presidency, even though he still refers to the war in Afghanistan as “not a war of choice but a war of necessity.”

The policy of escalating the war in Afghanistan with increased troop presence presents its own challenges. While the generals feel they are over-stretched on the ground, Obama finds that even his own party men in Congress have begun to question the wisdom of sending more troops. There appears to be a growing consensus within the United States to deploy more drones that are seen to be doing a great job in Pakistan and are credited with having decimated the top Taliban leadership in Pakistan territory, including dreaded Baitullah Mehsud.

According to a recent Rasmussen Report, 41 per cent of the voters who participated in the poll are less hopeful in August, as compared to a similar poll in June, of the situation improving in Afghanistan. A similar poll conducted in July by the NYT and CBS News showed that 57 per cent of Americans felt that things were not going right for them in Afghanistan.

July 2009 also saw the heaviest casualties among the western forces in the eight-year-war. The toll stood at 43 US soldiers and 31 from among the western allies. Mid-July also witnessed emotional scenes in the small town of Wootton Bassett in England when the bodies of eight British soldiers killed in one day’s fighting in Afghanistan arrived home. According to a report, an aircraft carrying the coffins landed at an air base in the western Wiltshire County, where a flyover of military jets took place, followed by a ceremony for the families of the dead.

Britain has 9,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, stationed in the seething southern Helmand Province which has witnessed pitched guerrilla warfare between the Taliban fighters and British soldiers. Britain is not used to such high casualties in Afghanistan, and the average Briton is beginning to question the value of fighting a long-drawn battle in a faraway land over the long term, especially when the real fight against the Taliban seems to have just begun.

While British Prime Minister Gordon Brown might emphasise the need to persist in Afghanistan, the overall public support for his government is dwindling. In his address to the House of Commons recently he declared: “It has been a very difficult summer and it is not over yet, but if we are to deny Helmand to the Taliban in the long term, if we are to defeat this vicious insurgency and by doing so make Britain and the world a safer place, then we must persist with our operations in Afghanistan”. Brown is also under sustained attack from the Conservative opposition for allegedly neglecting the safety of British troops by not equipping them properly for the war in Afghanistan.

While Britain is committed to “building a better and more stable world”, there is no denying the fact that the trans-Atlantic alliance is under tremendous pressure as the western allies try to look for solutions that would create conditions for a quiet withdrawal. For the moment this seems to be wishful thinking.

Courtesy: The Pioneer, September 5, 2009. Harinder Sekhon is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation

Taliban again reject Karzai offer to hold peace talks

* Top UN official urges Taliban to let polls go ahead saying it’s in Afghanistan’s interest

KABUL: A confident President Hamid Karzai offered peace talks to Taliban militants if they renounce violence and called for a new relationship with the West if he wins a second term in next month’s presidential election.

Karzai is considered the favorite in the Aug. 20 vote. But his chances could hinge on his fellow Pashtuns in the turbulent south and east, where US and British forces this month have suffered some of their highest casualties of the eight-year war. His only serious competition in the 39-candidate field is believed to be former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who could force a runoff if a low turnout among the Pashtuns, the country’s biggest ethnic group and the heart of the Taliban ranks, prevents Karzai from claiming a majority of the votes.

In an interview Monday with The Associated Press in his office, Karzai reached out to disaffected Pashtuns, calling for a dialogue with Taliban members who are not affiliated with Al Qaeda and who are willing to repudiate violence “and announce that publicly.” But the president said he was not yet prepared to discuss the key Taliban demand – a timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign troops – because he contends their continued presence is in the national interest.

“The Afghan people still want a fundamentally strong relation with the United States,” Karzai said. “I also know and the Afghan people also know that the presence of international troops in Afghanistan is bringing stability to Afghanistan.” Nevertheless, Karzai said the US and NATO presence must be based on a partnership where “the partners are not losing their lives, their property, their dignity as a consequence of that partnership.”

A Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousef Ahmadi, rejected talks, saying the insurgents would not discuss a ceasefire with any government that was a “servant of the foreigners.” He urged Afghans not to take part in next month’s election. During the interview, Karzai also said he wants operations at the US-run prison at Bagram Air Base, where about 600 Afghans are held, re-evaluated and inmates released unless there is evidence linking them to terrorism.

Elections: The top UN official in Afghanistan on Tuesday urged Taliban militants not to disrupt landmark polls. “The security concerns are of course significant,” said Kai Eide, the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). “My message to everybody including Taliban is it is in the interests of each and every Afghan that elections can take place in each province, in each district, in each village, so that all Afghans can express their views and cast their vote.” Eide said he was concerned about security in provinces where foreign and local forces are still battling Taliban rebels, but said it was “not in the interests of anybody” if large numbers of Afghans were unable to vote. agencies