Death of the ‘Imam’

January 25, 2011

By Shemrez Nauman Afzal
ZoneAsia-Pk

Amir Sultan Tarar AKA Colonel Imam

Brigadier Retired Amir Sultan Tarar is suspected to have died in Taliban captivity, presumably because of cardiac arrest, but suspicions and conspiracy theories indicate that his captors, the Taliban, may have murdered him because of non-payment of ransom by his family. However, the official quarters including Military sources as well as the Frontier Corps are finding it hard to verify the reports saying they have no confirmed information in this regard.

“We have been told that his dead body has been seen near Danday Darpa Khel area in North Waziristan Agency, but the news could not be confirmed nor could we get any picture of the dead body of Colonel Imam”, a senior Army official told this scribe when contacted. Similar remarks were offered by the FC sources.

Read Complete Article Here: Death of the ‘Imam’


Afghanistan’s Opportunity Costs

September 2, 2009

Paul Bauman

The Afghan debate in the blogosphere is reaching new heights of late, mainly due to the recent Afghan elections and Admiral Mullen’s comments concerning the deteriorating US position vis-à-vis the Taliban. One issue that seems to be lost in this discussion is the opportunity cost of US involvement in Afghanistan.

Opportunity cost is commonly understood as the value of the road not taken-what alternatives were not accomplished or attained as a result of a specific course of action. In other words, what is the US forgoing in the foreign policy landscape as a result of continued involvement in Afghanistan?

Afghanistan has the flavor of revving up and by all accounts, it will not be a short-term commitment. Any strategy centered around population security will take years to yield results.

Sure, the war against al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents has merit given the 9/11 attack, but what is the opportunity cost? After a steep, long-term cost in US lives and treasure, what will be the likely results? Will Afghanistan look any different and will it be materially better than it is today? Or are counter-insurgency operations there much like digging in the sand-no sooner are some insurgents removed before others fill in behind them?

Is this effort more important than having the ability to respond in a meaningful way to a multitude of international crises? Is it more important than reassuring US allies and partners that America will be there if they are so threatened?

While the US has been slogging through counter-insurgencies and nation-building, Russia has risen from the ashes of its Cold War implosion to exert a great amount of power in its “near abroad.” The fledgling democracy in Georgia got hammered by the Russian armed forces in a matter of days last year. Recently, Russian President Medvedev, posted to the public a letter to Ukraine’s president that essentially stated that he was a political corpse. Both Georgia and Ukraine were on deck to enter into NATO-backed by a very public US effort-and yet they’ve been left to the mercy of the Kremlin’s will.

If the Russians were not deterred from occupying the territory of a nation which was on the short list for NATO inclusion, what does that say about the state of US deterrence and its concomitant effect on US foreign policy?

The decade began with a transformation effort designed to make the armed forces more expeditionary and more suited to mobile, distributed operations throughout the globe and for a wide-range of missions. But the shift of resources to Iraq and Afghanistan means US forces are still dependent on large overseas bases. And rather than having the ability to engage across a spectrum of warfare, the U.S. military-most acutely our ground forces-is now almost solely equipped for counter-insurgency operations.

Is Afghanistan more important than rebuilding the heavily committed US military-in terms of both equipment and peronnel-to ensure the military instrument of power is prepared for the future? Is the likely outcome in Afghanistan more important than the financial needs of an ailing US economy? The US requires economic power to pursue its foreign policy goals as well, and this aspect of national power is currently flagging with the status and timeframe of economic recovery still in doubt.

Does it really make sense to make a greater commitment to Afghanistan when there are so many other uses for the US military and American treasure in the foreign policy realm? In short, America’s opportunity cost for meager success in Afghanistan may be the loss of nascent democracies in Georgia and Ukraine. This opportunity cost could grow exponentially if the actions of a resurgent Russia force other US allies to rethink their defense policy and divert resources from global expeditionary operations to shore up their home defense. If US allies pull back from global expeditionary operations-in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa to name a few-this will simply increase the pressure on the US to pick up the slack.

America’s Afghan commitment may also translate into a worn out US military. The costs of Iraqi involvement are now sunk cost and the end of extensive US involvement there is in sight as the local government and security forces assume responsibility for their country. But another decade of intense counter-insurgency and nation-building in Afghanistan will mean more extensive rebuilding and recapitalization programs. Of course, such programs will be more difficult to fund after prolonged wartime expenditures, a questionable economic recovery timeline, and a future more commonly understood to include massive government deficits.

The beauty of the opportunity cost concept is that it forces the nation to ask tough questions about priorities. The US foreign policy establishment should be asking what the likely outcome in Afghanistan will be and what US commitment will be required to achieve it. And then America should ask what things will NOT be achieved due to this Afghan commitment. This will reveal not only US priorities, but also the American opportunity cost for increasing the US investment in Afghanistan. Real answers to these bold questions may just surprise us, but at least the nation will go forward with its eyes wide open.

Lt Col Paul Bauman, U.S. Air Force, is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed in his articles are his own and do not reflect official U.S. Air Force or other U.S. Government opinions or policies.


It’s Obama’s War Now

May 22, 2009

Michael Schwartz

By replacing his commanding general in Afghanistan, President Obama has taken authorship of the two-front war in the Middle East.

This was not an orderly succession, but a rare event fraught with historical significance. The firing of battlefield commanding General David D. McKiernan — and his replacement by his former subordinate Lt. General Stanley A. McChrystal — is the first since President Truman famously removed General Douglas A. MacArthur from the Korean command. And before that headline producing event, Lincoln’s replacement of McClellan with Grant stands as its most noteworthy precedent.

Certainly this dramatic change of command is not comparable to those momentous occasions, but it does mark the beginning of a new battlefield strategy in Afghanistan. Perhaps more significantly, it stakes out the main thrust of Obama’s Middle East foreign policy: the use of dramatically escalated violence in a continuing effort to establish United States dominance in the “arc of instability” — the repository of the world’s remaining oil reserves.

Even the usually mute New York Times allowed it reporters, Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, to gesture at the true meaning of this leadership change in the very first sentence of their coverage: “The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David D. McKiernan, was forced out Monday in an abrupt shake-up intended to bring a more aggressive and innovative approach to a worsening seven-year war.”

The tip-off here is the phrase “more aggressive and innovative approach” — code for the use of the most vicious military tactics in the U.S. arsenal.

In the body of the article, Bumiller and Shanker veer close to overtly stating that the new strategy will drastically increase civilian casualties, make torture a routinized method for intelligence gathering, and proliferate all manner of brutal tactics that constitute the tool kit of ‘counterinsurgency.” The article is laced with pregnant phrases that are code for these actions. For example, they tell us that McChrystal “recent ran all commando operations in Iraq.” They do not, however, spell out what these “commando operations in Iraq” featured: incursions into Syria and Iran, selective assassination, the training and supervision of Iraqi military death squads, and, of course, the detention and of Iraqis suspected of having information about insurgent activities, and their delivery to torture chambers in Iraqi and American prisons.

Or consider this short paragraph reporting McChrystal’s signal qualifications for his new responsibility:

Forces under General McChrystal’s command were credited with finding and capturing Saddam Hussein and with tracking and killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. His success in using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents, and his training in unconventional warfare that emphasizes the need to protect the population, made him the best choice for the command in Afghanistan, Defense Department officials said.

The phrase “using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents” is truly fraught. Those who recall the demise of Zarqawi will remember that the “intelligence” developed in chasing Zarqawi involved the most brutal forms of torture — it coincided with “taking off the gloves” in Abu Ghraib and other detention centers. But beyond this, it was a period when torture was used not just on suspected insurgents, but primarily on community residents suspected of helping or harboring insurgents. It was a classic form of terrorism (a replication of virtually all imperial occupations) in which torture and detention of civilians are utilized as a warning against any support for resistance to the occupying power.

That was the “intelligence” part of his use of “unconventional warfare.” The “firepower” part of his training involved indiscriminant attacks on civilians. Remember that Zarqawi was killed by dropping a bomb in the house in which he was eating dinner. Also eating dinner in that house were 11 civilians who also died — collateral damage in military parlance. But this is only the tip of the “firepower” iceberg (to mix metaphors). Before killing Zarqawi, McChrystal’s troops had targeted dozens of other houses in which he they thought he might be present, and in doing so, they produced large numbers of collateral damage casualties. And, more broadly, his strategy of “intelligence and firepower” translated into assaulting or bombing hundreds of homes where insurgents were suspected of being present. McChrystal and the “forces” under his command were well aware that these hundreds and hundreds of assaulted or bombed dwellings contained thousands and thousand of Iraqi civilians. But this is the logic of “unconventional warfare”: if a building contains a suspected insurgent, full lethal firepower is applied, regardless of the presence of “human shields.”

Bumiller and Shanker do not tell the reader that McChyrstal and the other commander’s utilizing this strategy, produced the bloodbath in Iraq that yielded over one million deaths and five million refugees — and counting.

The irony in all this is the assertion that McChyrstal’s style of warfare “emphasizes the need to protect the population.” This sad distortion rests on the idea that full scale assaults on cities are indiscriminate attacks; whereas McChyrstal’s “intelligence and firepower” strategy utilize “precision bombs” that hit only those buildings suspected of harboring insurgents. Left unsaid is that fact that the targeted buildings contain the people who live there as well as “suspected insurgents.” Left unsaid is the fact that most houses in insurgent strongholds are suspected of containing insurgents.

As horrible as the Afghanistan war already is, the ascension of McChrystal signals a new level of carnage — and the economic and social immiseration of the hundreds of thousands who survive the onslaught.

But the most devastating part of this terrible tale is its significance as the most visible evidence that Obama’s foreign policy — like Bush’s discredited foreign policy — rests on using the most vicious and destructive military strategies aimed at intimidating the Afghan and Iraqi populations into accepting United States domination of their countries.

But even worse is the fact that the Obama administration expects to use the same tactics throughout the “arc of instability,” extending from the borders of China to the Horn of Africa. This was almost explicitly stated by Secretary of Defense Gates in his visit to “Camp Leatherneck” in Afghanistan, where, according to New York Times reporter Thom Shanker, “Mr. Gates predicted more of these messy, unconventional wars.”

The Obama administration is not planning to end the military attempt to conquer Iraq and Afghanistan; it fully expects the current escalation into Pakistan to be the first of several (or many more) such extensions of these wars.

President Obama and his cohort seek to succeed where Bush failed: to establish U.S. domination of the primary oil bearing region of the world.


Denial and Evasion on Afghanistan

March 30, 2009

14 Who Told Obama to Reconsider Escalating the War

By NORMAN SOLOMON

Is your representative speaking out against escalation of the Afghanistan war?

Last week, some members of Congress sent President Obama a letter that urged him to “reconsider” his order deploying 17,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

Everyone in the House of Representatives had ample opportunity to sign onto the letter. Beginning in late February, it circulated on Capitol Hill for more than two weeks. The letter was the most organized congressional move so far to challenge escalation of the war in Afghanistan.

But the list of signers was awfully short.

* California: Bob Filner, Michael Honda
* Hawaii: Neil Abercrombie
* Kentucky: Ed Whitfield
* Maryland: Roscoe Bartlett
* Massachusetts: Jim McGovern
* Michigan: John Conyers
* North Carolina: Howard Coble, Walter Jones
* Ohio: Marcy Kaptur, Dennis Kucinich
* Tennessee: John Duncan
* Texas: Ron Paul
* Wisconsin: Steve Kagen

We desperately need a substantive national debate on U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the Obama administration says that the problems of the region cannot be solved by military means, the basic approach is reliance on heightened military means.

One of several journalists in Afghanistan on a tour “organized by the staff of commanding Gen. David D. McKiernan,” the Washington Post’s Jackson Diehl, wrote a March 23 op-ed in support of an invigorated “counterinsurgency strategy.” With journalistic resolve, he explained: “Everyone expects a surge of violence and American casualties this year; no one expects a decisive improvement in the situation for at least several years beyond that.”

The commanding general, Diehl added, does not anticipate that the Afghan army “can defend the country on its own” until 2016. In effect, the message is to stay the course for another seven years: “The thousands of American soldiers and civilians pouring into the country deserve that strategic patience; without it, the sacrifices we will soon hear of will be wasted.”

And so, with chillingly familiar echoes, goes the perverse logic of escalating the war in Afghanistan. “Strategic patience” — more and more war — will be necessary so that those who must die will not have died in vain.

In contrast, the letter from the 14 members of the House (eight Democrats, six Republicans) lays down a clear line of opposition to the rationales for stepping up the warfare.

“If the intent is to leave behind a stable Afghanistan capable of governing itself, this military escalation may well be counterproductive,” the letter says. And it warns that “any perceived military success in Afghanistan might create pressure to increase military activity in Pakistan. This could very well lead to dangerous destabilization in the region and would increase hostility toward the United States.”

More than 400 members of the House declined to sign the letter. In effect, they failed to join in a historic challenge to a prevailing assumption — that the U.S. government must use massive violence for many more years to try to work Washington’s will on Afghanistan.

An old red-white-and-blue bumper sticker says: “These colors don’t run.”

A newer one says: “These colors don’t run… the world.”

Now, it’s time for another twist: “These colors won’t run… Afghanistan.”

But denial and evasion are in the political air.

Norman Solomon is the author of Made Love, Got War.


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